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Sammendrag 
Artikkelen «Labour Supply Models» inngår som kapittel 7 i Handbook of Microsimulation Modelling 
redigert av Cathal O’Donoghue, og blir utgitt i serien Contributions to Economic Analysis av Emerald 
Publishing Group. Artikkelen diskuterer modellering av arbeidstilbud i mikrokonomiske 
simuleringsmodeller. 
The encounter between microeconometric models of labour supply and
the microsimulation approach is the result of a long process. Large micro-
simulation models, as originally proposed by Orcutt (1957), were meant
to be behavioural, although not structural: behavioural responses were
typically empirical ‘reduced form’ approximations, with little foundations
on standard microeconomic theory (Orcutt, Greenberger, Korbel, &
Rivlin, 1961). A motivation for the reduced form approach was probably
a certain degree of mistrust for mainstream economic theory on the part
of Orcutt and his associates. Shortly after, large microsimulation models
became increasingly popular at the institutional and policy making level.
For good reasons, the main research and implementation efforts were
initially focussed upon the quality of data, the accuracy of the accounting
relationships and representativeness of the results. For many years, the
active microsimulation community has considered behavioural responses
(and in particular labour supply) either unimportant or unreliable or hard
to interpret. Later on, however, various motivations have progressively
contributed to a more positive attitude towards the inclusion of labour
supply responses into microsimulation models:
(i) The increasing policy interest in tax-beneﬁt reforms, their effect
on both distribution and efﬁciency and the realization that policy
analysis requires structural models (a long-standing message from
Marschak, 1953, possibly revived by Lucas, 1976).
1. Introduction
1.1. Microsimulation meets microeconometrics
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(ii) The development of the ﬁrst econometric approaches appropriate to
deal with the complexities introduced by tax-beneﬁt systems into the
opportunity sets (e.g. Burtless & Hausman, 1978; Heckman, 1974b;
Wales & Woodland, 1979).
(iii) The use of microsimulation techniques in order to compute labour
supply responses, starting approximately around the early 1980s
(e.g. Arrufat & Zabalza, 1986; Zabalza, 1983).1
(iv) The development of discrete choice labour supply models (starting
with Zabalza, Pissarides, & Barton, 1980) and of models based on
(various versions of) the Random Utility approach (Aaberge,
Dagsvik, & Strøm, 1995; Van Soest, 1995). Compared to the models
of the ﬁrst structural generation (as of point (ii) above), Random
Utility models are more ﬂexible, potentially able to account for any
complexity of the budget and opportunity sets and easier to be linked
to large microsimulation projects.
(v) The realization of the crucial importance of heterogeneous beha-
vioural responses in shaping the effects of policies (e.g. Aaberge,
Colombino, & Strøm, 1999).
From around the second half of the 1990s a (cautious) introduction of
labour supply responses into large microsimulation models begins.
Klevmarken (1997) provides a report on early efforts towards that pur-
pose. Creedy and Duncan (2002), Creedy and Kalb (2005b), Bourguignon
and Spadaro (2006) and Bargain and Peichl (2013) survey more recent
developments. O’Donoghue (2001) and Li and O’Donoghue (2013) pro-
vide a general discussion on microsimulation models.
In this chapter we focus on microsimulation used for ex ante policy
evaluation. To this end, it is required to consider a modelling framework
where behavioural responses are given a structural representation, that is
an economic model that allows separation of preferences (assumed to be
invariant with respect to policy changes) and policy parameters (Hurwicz,
1962). Hereafter we sketch a simple framework within which most of
what follows can be interpreted. We consider a sample of agents (house-
holds or individuals) indexed by i= 1, …, N. Agent i faces an opportunity
(or feasible) set Bi. The elements of Bi are vectors x that measure various
1 At least up to the end of the 1970s, the typical procedure consisted of evaluating elasticities
or policy effects with reference to the ‘average’ or in some sense ‘representative’ household.
Even the path-breaking contributions to structural labour supply modelling (e.g.
Hausman, 1985a, 1985b; Heckman, 1974a, 1974b) adopted the ‘average household’
approach or computed behavioural responses for different ‘types’ of households.
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1.2. A frame of reference
dimensions of labour supply (e.g. hours of work, sector of occupation, etc.)
and consumption or investment choices (e.g. transportation, child care,
training, fertility, etc.). In the simplest case x= (c, h), where h= hours of
work and c=net available income. The corresponding minimal representa-
tion of Bi is a budget set, e.g. Bi = ðc; hÞ : c≤ f ðwh; IÞ
 
, where w denotes the
hourly gross wage rate and f(.,.) is the tax-beneﬁt rule that transforms gross
labour earnings wh and unearned income I into net available income c.
More generally, there might be constraints on the feasible values of h, on
the way gross earnings are generated depending on labour contracts, etc.
The agents adopt decision rules Di that, given Bi, produce the choices xi.
The crucial assumptions of structural microeconometrics are:
(i) the decision rules Di can be identiﬁed using observations on the choice
xi and on the opportunity set Bi;
(ii) the decision rules Di are invariant with respect to policies (Hurwicz,
1962), that is changes in Bi, so that they can be applied to a different,
possibly hypothetical BPi in order to simulate the choices x
P
i .
Microsimulation plays therefore two roles: ﬁrst (arithmetic step), it
computes the new or reformed BPi (induced, e.g. by a reformed tax-beneﬁt
rule fP); second (behavioural step), it produces the new choices xPi .
The most common representation of the decision rule is the constrained
maximization of a utility function Ui(x) that represents the agents’ prefer-
ences: xi = max
x∈Bi
UiðxÞ. Once the preferences Ui(·)  and possibly some
policy-invariant parameters of Bi  are estimated, the effects of a policy
are simulated by xPi = max
x∈BP
i
UiðxÞ. The policy can be anything that can be
represented as a change in Bi. A crucial contribution of microsimulation is
that the agents’ heterogeneity allowed for in the microeconometric model
can be fully exploited when producing, interpreting and evaluating the
results. Thus, these models are very useful in order to simulate changes in
the tax-beneﬁt rule: reforms of personal income taxation, of child beneﬁts,
of income support mechanisms, etc. Other reforms that can be simulated
might concern changes in the admissible values of h, changes in the rules
(e.g. contracts) by which gross labour earnings are generated given h, etc.
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Within the general framework sketched above, one can adopt many
different approaches to representing the preferences and the opportunity
sets, to the assumptions concerning the agents’ heterogeneity, etc. In
Section 2 we discuss the main approaches to developing models of
labour supply. Section 3 illustrates the use of these models in ex ante
policy evaluations. The fact that microsimulation can produce highly dis-
aggregated and multidimensional results on the one hand contribute to
the richness of the policy evaluation, on the other hand calls for the devel-
opment of synthetic indexes in order to guide the comparison between
alternative policies: therefore, Section 4 is devoted to social evaluation
In this section we illustrate the main strategies that are, or have been,
adopted in modelling labour supply. They are collected under three labels:
the ‘Reduced-form’ approach, the Structural ‘Marginalist’ (Kuhn
Tucker) approach and the Random Utility Maximization (RUM)
approach. Although the latter approach is by now the dominating para-
digm, we devote some attention also to the previous two approaches since
it is useful to understand the problems they encountered and why the
RUM approach eventually prevailed.
We focus upon how to develop models that permit a ﬂexible and realis-
tic representation of complicated budget and opportunity sets and allow
for a rich representation of households’ and opportunities’ heterogeneity.
This is the most crucial problem to be faced when labour supply model-
ling is instrumental to policy evaluation, possibly within the context of
large microsimulation projects.
In what follows we will adopt hours of work as a conventional measure
of labour supply. However, most of what we write can easily be trans-
ferred to other dimensions or measures of labour supply. This observation
also applies to the ‘taxable income’ approach (e.g. Saez, Slemrod, &
Giertz, 2012), which is an important complementary perspective but does
not raise new issues from the point-of-view of the modelling strategy.
Useful surveys that also cover many of the topics treated in this section
are provided by Creedy and Duncan (2002), Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999), Blundell (2012), Creedy and Kalb (2005b), Blundell, MaCurdy,
and Meghir (2007), Meghir and Phillips (2008), Aaberge, Colombino, and
Wennemo (2009), Keane (2011) and Dagsvik, Jia, Kornstad, and
Thoresen (2014).
Up to the early 1970s, empirical studies of labour supply typically adopt a
‘reduced form’ labour supply function
2. Modelling strategies
2.1. The ‘Reduced Form’ approach
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of the simulation results. Section 5 focuses on recent exercises devoted
to identifying optimal tax-beneﬁt rules. Section 6 contains the conclu-
sions and comments on future directions.
h= lðw; IÞ þ e ð1Þ
where h denotes the observed hours of work (or some other convenient
measure of labour supply), l(w, I) is a function of an exogenous net wage
rate w and of an exogenous net income I and e is a random variable that
account for the effect of other unobserved variables. We refer to expres-
sion (1) as a reduced form since it simply embodies the hypothesis that
labour supply depends on w and I, but in general it is not a correct
(structural) representation of that dependence, especially when corner
solutions and non-linearities of the budget constraint are present. Corner
solutions (i.e. h= 0) are typically ignored or treated as interior solutions.
Income taxes are ignored or somehow accounted for by using the average
net wage rate. Examples of this type of analysis include Kosters (1966,
1969) and Bowen and Finegan (1969). Although the authors were
obviously aware that h could be interpreted as the solution of a con-
strained utility maximization problem (with corresponding ﬁrst-order
Lagrange or KuhnTucker conditions characterizing the solution), this
theoretical background was not considered to be useful or important. In
fact, if the budget constraint is linear and the solution is assumed to be
interior, constrained utility maximization theory simply tells you that h
will be a (linearly homogeneous) function of w and I.
Starting in the late 1960s, the importance of non-linear budget con-
straints  and of the theory appropriate to treat them  attracts more
attention. The reason seems to be twofold. On the one hand, the new-
born theory of optimal taxation suggests that important efﬁciency and
equity effects stem from the way taxes on labour earning are designed
(Mirrlees, 1971). On the other hand, at the policy level a strong interest
emerges in evaluating various welfare and ‘anti-poverty’ programs. These
policies introduce complications (non-linearities, non-convexities) into the
budget sets faced by the target population, which are  in general 
impossible to be adequately addressed within the reduced form approach.
Various contributions tried to circumvent the difﬁculties with more or less
ad-hoc procedures (e.g. Hall, 1973; Rosen, 1976). However, at a certain
point it had to be realized that an appropriate treatment of non-linear
budget constraints requires a ‘structural’ approach, that is a separate
identiﬁcation of preferences and constraints.
We denote as ‘marginalist’ the approach that works through the condi-
tions for a constrained maximum of the utility function, conditions that
usually involve marginal variations. Heckman’s (1974b) is perhaps the
ﬁrst empirical paper that explicitly uses the conditions characterizing the
solution of utility maximization subject to a non-linear budget constraint,
with the purpose of addressing a non-standard policy evaluation problem.
The policy problem addressed by Heckman (1974b) is the evaluation of a
child-related welfare policy that introduces signiﬁcant complications in
the budget set. The author observes that in order to make such evaluation
one has to estimate the preferences as separated from the constraints: ‘The
essence of the problem involves utility comparisons between two or more
discrete alternatives. Such comparisons inherently require information
about consumer preferences in a way not easily obtained from ordinary
labor-supply functions’ (Heckman, 1974b, p. S136). Moreover ‘… the abil-
ity to make … (the separation between preferences and constraints) ... is
2.2. The structural ‘Marginalist’ approach
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less important if we are willing to make the conventional assumption that
wage rates are independent of hours of work ... but becomes quite important
when we acknowledge the existence of progressive taxation, welfare regula-
tions, and time and money costs of work’ (Heckman, 1974b, p. S142). The
author starts from an empirical speciﬁcation of the compensated labour
supply function. From it, he integrates back to the indirect utility function
and the uncompensated labour supply function. The estimates of the latter
also identify the direct utility function. This procedure accounts for the
non-linearities of the current budget constraint and permits to simulate
the effects of reformed (non-linear) budget constraints. Heckman’s presen-
tation of his method was probably perceived as too speciﬁc of the
addressed policy issue and to the best of our knowledge was not adopted
in other contributions. However, besides the policy application, the paper
in fact revives the message left by Marschak (1953) and might be consid-
ered as a ‘manifesto’ for a structural approach to empirical labour supply
analysis with an appropriate representation of non-linear budget con-
straints, corner solutions and the identiﬁcation of preferences as separated
by constraints. The methodological importance of Heckman (1974b) is
analogous to Tobin’s (1958), a path-breaking contribution to linking
a microeconometric analysis to the requirements of a non-standard
opportunity set due to binding non-negativity constraints.2 It is interesting
to observe that, almost simultaneously, an analogous (although less
constructive than Heckman’s) ‘manifesto’ for structural analysis appears in
the macroeconometrics literature (Lucas, 1976). A few years later, Burtless
and Hausman (1978), Wales and Woodland (1979) and Hausman (1979,
1985b) addressed essentially the same type of problems and developed
a method speciﬁcally appropriate for piecewise linear budget constraints.
The structural marginalist approach can be represented by any of the
following four alternative ways:
(1) Specify a direct utility u(c,h) function and solve
max
c;h
uðc; hÞ
s:t:
c=whþ I
to get a labour supply function h(w,I), where
c= consumption (=income)
h= hours of work
2 In his comment to Heckman’s paper, Rosen (1974) writes: ‘… Heckman clearly has opened
a lot of new territory in the economics of labour supply …. Future studies in this area are
bound to be affected for many years to come by Heckman’s paper.’
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   ð2Þ
w=wage rate
I= exogenous income.
Wales and Woodland (1979), Zabalza (1983) and Arrufat and Zabalza
(1986) adopt this approach starting from a CES utility function.
(2) Specify the indirect utility function u*(w,I) and obtain the labour
supply function through Roy’s Theorem: hðw; IÞ= ∂u
 ðw;IÞ
∂w
= ∂u
 ðw;IÞ
∂I
. An
example is provided by Wales and Woodland (1976), who start from an
Indirect Translog utility function.
(3) Specify the uncompensated labour supply function h(w,I)  for
example a linear function  remembering that if we want it to be consistent
with the model of constrained utility maximization, it will have to
satisfy Slutsky’s conditions. In fact, this is the approach followed for exam-
ple by Burtless and Hausman (1978) and Hausman (1980, 1985a), where
linear or log-linear labour supply functions are speciﬁed. The indirect
utility function can be retrieved by ‘integrating’ the Roy’s identity (treated
as a differential equation). The dual relationship between the indirect
and the direct utility function allows, if needed, to recover the latter from
the former.
(4) Specify the compensated labour supply function ~hðw; uÞ and use
Shephard’s Lemma − ∂eðw;uÞ
∂w
= ~hðw; uÞ to recover (by integration) the
expenditure function, that is the minimum unearned income needed to
attain the utility level u, given the wage rate w. Then, by setting e(w,u)=I
we obtain (by inversion) the indirect utility function u= u*(w,I). Roy’s
Theorem can then be applied to obtain the uncompensated labour supply
function h(w,I). The method used by Heckman (1974b) is in fact a variant
of this fourth way of proceeding (Rosen, 1974).
All the above four routes guarantee a strict consistency between the
labour supply functions and the preferences. Note that procedure (1)
directly applies the Lagrange or KuhnTucker conditions charactering
the maximization of a well-behaved utility function subject to the budget
constraint, whereas procedures (2), (3) and (4) work through an indirect
application of the KuhnTucker conditions. The advantage of the struc-
tural ‘marginalist’ modelling approach  independent of whether proce-
dure (1), (2), (3) or (4) is used  is that it allows identiﬁcation of
consumption-leisure preferences. Thus, given the estimates of the labour
supply function one can also identify the preferences. It is important to
remember that what can be directly estimated with observed data is just
the uncompensated labour supply h(w,I). Preferences can be recovered
either because h(w,I) is obtained by the maximization of a direct utility
function u(h,c)  as in procedure (1)  or because we exploit Roy’s
Theorem or Shephard’s Lemma as in procedures (2), (3) and (4). Given
the preferences, one can simulate new choices under a reformed budget
constraint. In choosing the (direct or indirect) speciﬁcation of the prefer-
ences or of the labour supply function, typically a trade-off between
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ﬂexibility and analytical tractability has to be faced: in this respect, a very
useful reference is Stern (1986).
If the analysis includes the possibility of corner solutions, the optimal
labour supply h* solves
max
c;h
uðc; hÞ
s:t:
c=whþ I
If h(w,I) solves max
c;h
uðc; hÞ s:t: c=whþ I then it is easily veriﬁed that
h =
hðw; IÞ if hðw; IÞ> 0
0 hðw; IÞ≤ 0

In view of the empirical analysis, usually we must account for unobserved
(by the analyst) heterogeneity of preferences and/or for measurement/
optimization errors.
Heterogeneity of preferences can be introduced into the labour supply
function by assuming that one or more of its parameters depend on
observed and/or unobserved variables. For example, h(w,I) might be spe-
ciﬁed as:
hðw; IÞ= ηðw; IÞ þ ɛ1
might use Selection-Corrected Least Squares as elaborated by Heckman
(1979).
Parallel to the corner solutions, we face the problem of unobserved wage
rates for those who do not work. One could use a two-equation ‘Tobit’ as
in Heckman (1974a) or adopt a multi-step selection-correction approach
(Heckman, 1979), namely: estimate a wage equation (corrected for
2.2.1. Dealing with corner solutions
2.2.2. Dealing with unobserved wage rates
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   ð4Þ
ð5Þ
where η(w,I) is a function of observed variables and ɛ1 is a random vari-
able that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity of preferences. If ɛ1 is the
only source of randomness from the analyst’s point-of-view, then the ana-
lyst is assuming that the observed value h is uniquely generated by the
solution of problem (3). During the pre-Heckman eve, it was common
to simply use OLS on the sample with positive values of h.
Heckman (1974a) adopts a Tobit-like approach: assuming ɛ1∼N(0,σ2)
the contribution to the likelihood is ϕ h− ησ
ðw;IÞ if the household works h
hours and Φ − ησ
ðw;IÞ if the household does not work. Alternatively, one
  ð3Þ
h≥0
non-random sample selection) on the working sub-sample; compute the
systematic part of the wage equation and impute it to everyone. The ran-
dom error of the wage equation can be accounted for in different ways
depending on the functional form of η(w,I) and on the assumptions made
on correlation between the wage equation and the hours equation.
Measurement or optimization errors can also be accounted for. For exam-
ple, we might assume that what we observe is
h= h þ ɛ2
for the decision maker’s inability to implement the optimal choice. The
measurement/optimization error can be speciﬁed in different ways
depending on what we assume about the process that generates it. For
example, a common assumption is that if desired hours are positive then
it can happen that actual hours are different and possibly even equal to 0;
however, if desired hours are 0, then also actual hours are 0. According to
these assumptions, we then have:
h=
ηðw; IÞ þ ɛ1þ ɛ2 if ηðw; IÞ þ ɛ1 > 0 and ηðw; IÞ þ ɛ1þ ɛ2 > 0
max
c;h
2.2.3. Optimization errors, involuntary unemployment, quantity constraints
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                                                                                                    ð8Þ
ð6Þ
where h* is the desired choice and ɛ2 is a random variable that accounts
for the analyst’s inability to accurately measure the choice made and/or
uðc; hÞ
s:t:
c=
f (w h ; I)
   ð7Þ
2.2.4. Non-linear budget constraints
Let us consider the following modiﬁcation of problem (2):
(
0 otherwise
specify a complementary equation that generates involuntary unemploy-
ment, for example as in Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1987).
A different perspective to look at the possible divergence between opti-
mal and observed hours is to think of workers as ‘captive’ to certain
choices, as in Harris and Duncan (2002). Some authors, within the ‘mar-
ginalist’ approach, have exploited datasets containing explicit information
on quantity constraints in the opportunity sets, for example Ham (1982),
Colombino and Zabalza (1982), Colombino (1985), Altonji and Paxson
(1988) and Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990).
Speciﬁcation (7)  also  accounts  for  involuntary  unemployment,  that  is the
event:     η(w,I)+ɛ1 > 0 and η(w,I)+ɛ1 + ɛ2 < 0. Alternatively, one could
∂h
=
∂u
∂c
=
∂f
The condition is not sufﬁcient anymore if u(.,.) is not quasi-concave
and/or the budget set is not concave. In these cases, the sufﬁcient condi-
tions for identifying a solution might become very cumbersome and
unpractical to use in applied research. Of course, also the non-
differentiability of f(.,.) creates problems. However, most actual or
reformed tax-beneﬁt rules belong to the piecewise linear family, that is
they can be represented as a combination of linear segments. Starting with
Burtless and Hausman (1978), a procedure has been designed for identify-
ing the solution on convex budged sets deﬁned by piecewise linear con-
straints. Let us suppose that as long as the consumer’s earnings do not
exceed a certain amount E, she is not required to pay taxes on her earn-
ings. However, for every Euro of earnings above E she has to pay taxes
according to a marginal tax rate τ. The ﬁrst segment has slope w, the sec-
ond segment has slope equal to w(1− τ). It is useful to deﬁne
H = ðE=wÞ=hours of work corresponding to the ‘kink’,
and I+E−w(1− τ)H= I+Eτ= ‘virtual’ exogenous income associated
to the second segment (i.e. the intercept of the line that lies on the second
segment). Note that the exogenous income associated to the ﬁrst segment
is instead I, which is assumed to be tax-free.
Then the problem is:
max
c;h
uðc; hÞ
s:t:
c≤ Iþwh
c≤ IþEτþwð1− τÞh
h≥ 0
Now deﬁne h(n,q) as the ‘virtual’ labour supply given a wage rate n and
an exogenous income q, that is the value of h that solves the problem
max
c;h
uðc; hÞ
s:t:
c= qþ nh
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∂h
   ð9Þ
   ð10Þ
   ð11Þ
Here the function f(.,.) represents the tax-beneﬁt rule, that is the rule
according to which the gross earnings wh and the exogenous gross income
I are turned into net available income c (=consumption). If u(.,.) and f(.,.)
are differentiable, u(.,.) is quasi-concave and f(.,.) is concave in h (i.e. the
budget set is convex), then the following condition (together with the bud-
get constraint) is necessary and sufﬁcient for a (interior) solution of pro-
blem (8):
−∂u
h =
0 if hðw; IÞ≤ 0
hðw; IÞ if 0< hðw; IÞ<H
H if hðw; IÞ≥H and h wð1− τÞ; IþEτð Þ≤H
h wð1− τÞ; IþEτð Þ if h wð1− τÞ; IþEτð Þ>H
8><
>:
The same procedure can be used to characterize the solution when the
problem involves more than two segments and can be extended (with due
modiﬁcations) to cases with non-convex budget sets. The method origin-
ally proposed by Heckman (1974b) also adopts a very similar logic.
The structural ‘marginalist’ approach can be extended in many direc-
tions. Instead of representing the budget constraint with a combination of
linear segments (which in most cases in fact correspond to the real
system), one could use a smooth non-linear approximation (e.g. Flood &
MaCurdy, 1992). Random components capturing preference heterogene-
ity and/or measurement/optimization errors can be speciﬁed in a way
similar to what illustrated in the linear budget constraint case. In principle
it can also be extended to cover simultaneous household decisions,
although most of the applications treat unconditional husband’s decisions
or wife’s decisions conditional on husband’s ones. Useful presentations
are provided by Hausman (1979, 1985a), Mofﬁtt (1986), Heckman and
MaCurdy (1986) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). Duncan and Stark
(2000) have developed an algorithm for generating piecewise linear budget
constraints for estimation or simulation purposes. Applications to differ-
ent countries and different tax-beneﬁt rules and reforms include Burtless
and Hausman (1978), Hausman (1979, 1980, 1985a, 1985b), Blomquist
(1983), Zabalza (1983), Arrufat and Zabalza (1986), Blomquist and
Hansson-Brusewitz (1990), Bourguignon and Magnac (1990), Colombino
and Del Boca (1990), MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1993), Triest (1990),
Van Soest, Woittiez, and Kapteyn (1990) and Bloemen and Kapteyn
(2008).3 More general surveys, also covering contributions that belong to
the structural ‘marginalist’ approach, include Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999), Blundell et al. (2007), Meghir and Phillips (2008) and Keane (2011).
In the second half of the 1980s the structural ‘marginalist’ approach
was thought to be a dominating paradigm and a special number of the
Journal of Human Resources (1990) was dedicated to applications of this
method to various countries. The same issue of the JHR, however, also
collects most of the critiques that eventually led to adopting alternative
approaches. The method proposed by Heckman as well as the method
3 Hausman and Wise (1980), although applied to the demand for housing and not to labour
supply, is a very clear illustration of how the structural marginalist approach can be
applied to non-convex budget sets.
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   ð12Þ
The solution to problem (10) is then characterized as follows:
proposed by Hausman and co-authors in practice turn out to be not so
easily applicable to problems that are more complicated than those for
which they were originally exempliﬁed. First, the application is general
and straightforward with convex budget sets (e.g. those generated by pro-
gressive taxation) and a two-good case (e.g. leisure and consumption in
the individual labour supply model). Instead, it is more case-speciﬁc and
tends to become computationally cumbersome when the decision makers
face non-convex budget sets and/or when more than two goods are choice
variables (e.g. in the case of a many-person household). Second, in view
of the computational problems, the above approach essentially forces the
researcher to choose relatively simple speciﬁcations for the utility function
or the labour supply functions. Third, computational and statistical con-
sistency of ML estimation of the model requires imposing a priori the
quasi-concavity of the utility function (e.g. Kapteyn, Kooreman, & van
Soest, 1990; MaCurdy et al., 1993).4
As a response to the problems mentioned above, since the early 1990s
researchers have made use of another innovative research effort which
matured in the ﬁrst half of the 1970s, that is the random utility maximiza-
tion (RUM) model  or some variations of it  developed by McFadden
(1974, 1984). The crucial advantage of this approach is that the solution
of the utility maximization problem is represented in terms of compari-
sons of absolute values of utility rather than in terms of marginal varia-
tions of utility, and it is not affected by the speciﬁcation of the utility
function nor of the tax-beneﬁt rule. This approach is very convenient
when compared to the previous ones, since it does not require going
through complicated KuhnTucker conditions involving derivatives of
the utility function and of the budget constraints. Therefore, it is not
affected by the complexity of the rule that deﬁnes the budget set or by
how many goods are contained in the utility function. Equally important,
the deterministic part of the utility function can be speciﬁed in a very ﬂex-
ible way without worrying about the computational problems. The most
popular version adopts the Extreme Value distribution for the stochastic
component, which leads to an easy and intuitive expression for the prob-
ability that any particular alternative is chosen (i.e. the Multinomial or
Conditional Logit model).
4 The simultaneous household decision model Hausman and Ruud (1984) has essentially
remained an isolated contribution. On the difﬁculties of applying the ‘marginalist’
approach outside the simplest scenarios, see also Bloemen and Kapteyn (2008).
2.3. The random utility maximization approach
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This approach essentially consists in representing the budget set with a set
of discrete alternatives or jobs. Early and path-breaking contributions
include Zabalza et al. (1980), where labour supply is represented in terms
of probabilities of choosing alternative hours of work or alternative jobs.
This contribution, however, is essentially an ordinal probit analysis.
Especially in view of modelling simultaneous household decisions, the
Conditional Multinomial Logit model is much more convenient. This is
the line chosen by Van Soest (1995). Although this very inﬂuential contri-
bution can be classiﬁed as belonging to the RUM family, we denote it
more speciﬁcally as a Discrete Choice (DC) model. First, the discreteness
of the opportunity set is a distinctive feature of it (this is not the case in
general for RUM models). Second, the random term that generates the
probabilistic choices is given an eclectic interpretation that includes both
the RUM-McFadden (1974, 1984) interpretation and the optimization
error interpretation (the latter leading to a non-random utility model).
Besides Van Soest (1995), many contributions have adopted the DC model
during the last two decades. Among others: Duncan and Giles (1996),
Bingley and Walker (1997), Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir
(2000), Van Soest, Das, and Gong (2002), Creedy, Kalb, and Scutella
(2006), Haan and Steiner (2005), Brewer, Duncan, Shephard, and Suarez
(2006), Labeaga, Oliver, and Spadaro (2008), Fuest, Peichl, and Schaefer
(2008), Haan and Wrohlich (2011), Blundell and Shephard (2012), Bargain,
Decoster, et al. (2013), and Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2014).
The DC model typically treats (also) couples with simultaneous deci-
sions of the two partners, but in order to keep the illustration simple, we
will discuss the singles case below: the extension to couples is straightfor-
ward. The household chooses among H+ 1 alternatives or h= 0, 1, …, T.
The utility derived from alternative h is ﬁrst deﬁned as non-stochastic,
v(f(wh,I),h), where w is the ﬁxed (individual-speciﬁc) gross wage rate, I is
the exogenous income and f(.,.) is the tax-transfer rule that transforms
gross incomes into net available income. In order to model the observed
hours of work as the result of a probabilistic process, a random variable ɛ
is added to the previously deﬁned utility function: v(f(wh,I),h)+ɛ. As men-
tioned above, the random term is typically given two different interpreta-
tions (e.g. Van Soest, 1995): (i) the utility contribution of unobserved
characteristics of the alternative choices; (ii) a measurement/optimization
error. Interpretation (i) is compatible with the classic RUM interpretation
and implies that the household are observed as choosing exactly what
they prefer, and what they prefer is decided on the basis of v(f(wh,I),h)+ɛ.
Interpretation (ii) instead implies that the household’s preference are mea-
sured by v(f(wh,I),h) but the alternative to which they are matched does
not maximize v(f(wh,I),h) but rather v(f(wh,I),h)+ɛ: this might happen
because they make errors or because some other unexpected process
2.3.1. The discrete choice model
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displaces them from the preferred choices. The two interpretations, in
principle, have also different implications in view of the simulation and of
the welfare evaluation. The contributions adopting the DC approach
stress the importance of a very ﬂexible speciﬁcation of v(f(wh,I),h) and of
checking for its quasi-concavity (e.g. Van Soest, 1995; Van Soest et al.,
2002). This focus of attention suggests that this approach tends to
consider v(f(wh,I),h) as the true utility function and ɛ as a measurement/
optimization error.5 Consistently, preference heterogeneity is preferably
introduced through random preference parameters.
By assuming that ɛ is i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value, one gets the
Multinomial Logit or Conditional Logit expression for the probability
that the household is observed working h hours:6
PðhÞ= exp v f ðwh; IÞ; hð Þ
 
PT
y= 0
exp v f ðwy; IÞ; yð Þ 
be adopted. Let us deﬁne subsets S0,…, SL of the set (0, 1,…, H). Clearly,
the deﬁnition of the subsets should reﬂect some hypothesis upon the differ-
ences between the values of h with respect to the factors (a) and (b)
mentioned above. Now we specify the choice probability as follows:
PðhÞ= exp v f ðwh; IÞ; hð Þ þ
P
ℓ γℓ1ðh∈ SℓÞ
 
PT
y= 0
exp v f ðwy; IÞ; yð Þ þ Pℓ γℓ1ðy∈ SℓÞ 
5 A motivation for interpreting ɛ as a measurement/optimization error in DC models is the
relatively small number of values of h that are typically allowed to belong to the opportu-
nity set, in many cases just three (non-participation, part-time and full-time). Since the
observed distribution of hours worked is much more dispersed, it makes sense to allow for
a measurement/optimization error.
6 The derivation of the Conditional Logit expression for utility maximization under the
assumption that the utility random components are i.i.d. Type I extreme value distributed
is due to McFadden (1974). It is conventional to call Conditional Logit a Multinomial
Logit model with generic attributes (i.e. attributes  like hours or income  whose values
vary across alternatives).
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Model (13) usually does not ﬁt labour supply data very well. For example
van Soest (1995) notes that the model over-predicts the number of people
working part-time. More generally, certain types of jobs might dif- fer
according to a number of systematic factors that are not accounted forby
the observed variables contained in v: (a) availability or density of job-
types; (b) ﬁxed costs; (c) search costs; (d) systematic utility components. In
order to account for these factors the following ‘dummies reﬁnement’ can
U f ðwh; IÞ; h; j
is a variable that captures other job and/or individual characteristics and ɛ
is a random variable that varies across market and non-market alternatives.
A ﬁrst difference with respect to the DC model is that the utility
function is directly speciﬁed as stochastic. The random component is
interpreted as in McFadden’s (1974) presentations of the Conditional
Logit model: besides the observed characteristics, there are other charac-
teristics j of the job or of the household-job match that are observed by
the household but not by the econometrician. Commuting time or
required skill (when not observed by the analyst) are possible examples of
the characteristics captured by j. Their effect upon utility is captured by
ɛ(w,h,j).
Second, the households maximize their utility by choosing not simply
hours but rather opportunities (‘jobs’) deﬁned by hours of work h, wage
rates w (which can change across jobs for the same household) and other
unobserved (by the analyst) attributes j. In the DC model, the households’
choices (how many hours of work) are analogous to the choices of a con-
sumer deciding how many units of a consumption good (like meat, milk
or gasoline) to buy every week. In the RURO model, the household is
closer to the McFadden’s commuter choosing among car, train or the
2.3.2. The random utilityRandom opportunities model
The Random UtilityRandom Opportunities (RURO) model is an exten-
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where 1(e)=1 iff e is true. Many papers have adopted this reﬁnement, for
example Van Soest (1995), Callan and Van Soest (1996) and Kalb (2000)
among others. Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999), Dagsvik and Strøm (2006),
Colombino, Locatelli, Narazani, and O’Donoghue (2010) and Colombino
(2013) also implement a similar procedure, which however is based on a
speciﬁc structural interpretation of the dummies and of their coefﬁcients
(see expressions (21) and (22)). An alternative adjustment consists of
imputing a monetary cost (or beneﬁt) to some ranges of work hours:
   ð15Þ
 
PðhÞ = exp
Ă
vðf ðwh; IÞ þPℓ cℓ1ðh ∈ SℓÞ; hÞ
y
P
=
T
0
exp
Ă
vðf ðwy; IÞ þ Pℓ cℓ1ðy∈ SℓÞ; yÞ
A popular speciﬁcation of the (15)-type is interpreted as accounting
for ﬁxed costs of working c (e.g. Duncan & Harris, 2002; see also the sur-
vey by Blundell et al., 2007).
sion of McFadden’s RUM model. The utility is assumed to be of the
following form:
ð Þ = vðf ðwh; IÞ; hÞ þ ɛðw; h; jÞ ð16Þ
where h is hours of work, w is the wage rate, I is the exogenous income, f is
a tax-transfer function that transforms gross incomes into net income, j
BART shuttle when travelling along the San Francisco Bay (Domencich
& McFadden, 1975) or to the McFadden’s household choosing among
different apartment in different locations (McFadden, 1978).
Third, besides not observing the other job characteristics j, the analyst
does not know exactly which and how many jobs are contained in the
household opportunity set; therefore the opportunity set can be seen as
random from the analyst’s viewpoint. The opportunity set will in general
contain more than one job of the same (w,h) type. These jobs will differ
depending on the value of other unobserved (by the analyst) attributes.
This implies that the number (or the density) of jobs belonging to the dif-
ferent types will plays a crucial role in the model.
In Aaberge et al. (1995) the range of values of (w,h) is assumed to be
continuous. Let B be the set of admissible values of (w,h) and p(x,y) the
density of jobs of type (x,y). The household chooses h and j so as to maxi-
mize v(f(wh,I),h)+ɛ(j). Then it turns out that we get the (continuous) con-
ditional logit expression for the probability density function of a (w,h)
choice:
φðw; hÞ=
exp
n
v f ðwh; IÞ; hð Þ
o
pðw; hÞ
Z
ðx;yÞ∈B
exp
n
v f ðxy; IÞ; yð Þ
o
exp
n
v f ðwh; IÞ; hð Þ
o
ðx;yÞ∈Bexp
n
v f ðxy; IÞ; y
The discrete version can be interpreted either as a more realistic repre-
sentation or as computational simpliﬁcation of the continuous version.7
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o
ð Þ
φðw; hÞ=
pðw; hÞ
P
  (17Þ
pðx; yÞ dx dy
pðx; yÞ
7 Tummers and Woittiez (1991) and Dickens and Lundberg (1993) develop labour supply
models not based on the same stochastic assumptions as RURO’s where different
hours of work have a different probability of being available and thus have some similarity
with model (18). An alternative way to account for quantity constraints in the opportu-
nity set is developed by Harris and Duncan (2002).
Expression (17) is based on Dagsvik (1994). The model is close to the
continuous spatial model developed by Ben-Akiva and Watanatada
(1981). It can also be seen as an extension of the McFadden’s Conditional
Logit model where the systematic utility of a job type (w,h) is ‘weighted’
by the number of jobs of that type available in the opportunity set. On
the foundations and various applications of RURO models, see also
Dagsvik (2000) and Dagsvik et al. (2014). Aaberge et al. (1999) formally
derive a discrete version of model (17):
ð19Þ
So far, in all the applications of the RURO the opportunity density p
(w,h) is ﬁrst factorized as
pðw; hÞ= p1g1ðhÞg2ðwÞ if h> 0
1− p1 if h= 0

φðhÞ= exp v f ðwh; IÞ; yð Þ
 
pðhÞP
y∈B
exp v f ðwy; IÞ; yð Þ pðyÞ
By specifying the opportunity density p(y) as uniform-with-peaks, we
get the following expression:
φðhÞ=
exp
n
v f ðwh; IÞ; hð Þ þ
o
γ01ðh > 0Þ þ
PL
ℓ= 1
γℓ1ðh∈ SℓÞ
P
y∈B
exp v f ðwy; IÞ; xð Þ þ γ01ðy> 0Þ þ
PL
ℓ= 1
γℓ1ðy∈ Sℓ
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   ð19Þ
Note that expression (13) can be seen as a special case of expression
Þ
 
      ð21Þ
  ð20Þ
where p1 denotes the density of alternatives with h > 0, that is market jobs,
and g1(h) and g2(w) are the densities of w and h conditional on h > 0. The
conditional density of hours is speciﬁed as uniform-with-peaks (to be esti-
mated) corresponding to part-time and full-time. The conditional density
of wage rates is assumed to be log-normal. Details can be found in the
work by Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999, 2013). All the densities p1, g1(h), g2(w)
and the density of w can depend on household or job characteristics.
From expressions (13) and (18), we can see that the solution of the
utility maximization problem is expressed in terms of comparisons of
absolute values of utility rather than in terms of marginal variations of
utility and it is not affected by the speciﬁcation of v(.,.) or f(.,.). One can
choose relatively general and complicated speciﬁcations for v and/or
accounting for complex tax-transfer rules f without affecting the charac-
terization of behaviour and without signiﬁcantly affect the computational
burden involved by the estimation or simulation of the model. This holds
for both the DC model and the RURO model (whether in continuous or
discrete version). It is not often realized in the literature that the advan-
tages of the RUM approach are due more to the representation of choice
as the maximization of a random utility, rather than to the discreteness of
the choice set.
(18) when the wage rate w is treated as a ﬁxed characteristic of the
household (invariant with respect to the alternatives) and p(x,y)=constant
for all (x,y).
It is also useful to observe that the opportunity density p(x,y) can be
speciﬁed in such a way that expression (18) reduces to a DC model with
dummies reﬁnement. For example, Colombino (2013) starts by consider-
ing a model with ﬁxed individual-speciﬁc wage rates:
with
γ0 = ln JþA0; γℓ = ln
Jℓ
J
 
þAℓ
J= number of alternatives with h> 0,
Jl= number of alternatives with h ∈ Sl (e.g. Sl might be the set of hours
values classiﬁed as ‘part-time’),
A0 and Al are constants.
simulation  can be used to develop an equilibrium simulation procedure.
φðw; hÞ= exp v f ðwh; IÞ; hð Þ
 
pðw; hÞ=qðw; hÞP
ðx;yÞ∈ B^
2.3.3. The representation of the opportunity set
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Expression (21) is formally equivalent to the DC model with the ‘dum-
mies reﬁnement’: however, here the coefﬁcients γ have a speciﬁc structural
interpretation, which  as we will see in the section dedicated to policy
ð23Þ
exp
Ă
vðf ðxy; IÞ; yÞ pðx; yÞ=qðx; yÞ
where B^ is the set of sampled alternatives. Expression (23) can also be
interpreted as a computational approximation to expression (17). The
same method is explained in detail and applied by Train, McFadden, and
Ben-Akiva (1987). Aaberge et al. (2009) discuss and evaluate different
methods of representing the opportunity set and ﬁnd that they might have
an important impact on the results of the policy simulation.
In the continuous version of the RURO model, the opportunity set in prin-
ciple can contain the whole positive quadrant, that is all the positive values
of (w,h). If instead one adopts a discrete representation of the choice set
(as in the DC model or as in the (18)-version of the RURO model) then
one has to decide which alternatives are to be included in the opportunity
set (besides the chosen alternative). DC models typically assume the
opportunity set is ﬁxed and imputed to every household. For example, one
might divide the hours interval (0,T) into equal sub-intervals and pick one
value in each sub-interval (e.g. the midpoint, or a randomly chosen point).
The wage rate is also ﬁxed and household-speciﬁc: therefore, for every
value h, the corresponding gross earnings are equal to wh. In the RURO
models, the opportunity set is unknown since the opportunity density
p(w,h) must be estimated. The opportunity set used in the estimation (and
in the simulations) can then be interpreted as a sample drawn from an
unknown population. Therefore, the sampling method emerges as a rele-
vant issue. Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999), Aaberge, Colombino, and Strøm
(2004), Aaberge et al. (2013) sample alternative (w,h) values from a pre-
estimated density q(w,h) and, following McFadden (1978) and Ben-Akiva
and Lerman (1985), and use a re-weighted version of expression (18):
Pðw; hÞ= exp v f ðwh; IÞ; hð Þ
 
PT
k= 0
exp v f ðwk; IÞ; kð Þ 
The likelihood of an observation with h= 0 and unobserved wage rate
would instead be:
Pðh= 0Þ=
Z
exp v f ð0; IÞ; 0ð Þ PT
k= 0
φðw;hÞ=
exp v f ðwh;IÞ;hð Þ p1g1ðhÞg2ðwÞ
exp v f ð0;IÞ;0ð Þ ð1−p1Þþ X
ðx;yÞ≠0
exp v f ðxy; IÞ;yð Þ p1g1ðyÞg2ðxÞ dxdy if h > 0
exp v f ð0;IÞ;0ð Þ ð1−p1Þ
exp v f ð0;IÞ;0ð Þ ð1−p1Þþ X
ðx;yÞ≠0
exp v f ðxy; IÞ;yð Þ p1g1ðyÞg2ðxÞ dxdy
8>>>><
>>>>:
Alternatively, one could use a two-step procedure for imputing
unobserved wages. In the ﬁrst step, the wage equation is estimated. In the
second step, the predicted wage rate replaces the missing values (or, alter-
natively, both the missing and the observed values). The random term of
the wage equation is added to the systematic part and integrated (or ‘aver-
aged’) out with a simulation procedure (e.g. Van Soest, 1995). Lo¨fﬂer,
Peichl, and Siegloch (2013) illustrate that the estimated labour supply elas-
ticities can be very sensitive to the way unobserved wage rates are treated.
Both the simultaneous and the two-steps procedures illustrated above
assume that the random term of the wage equation is uncorrelated with
the random term of the utility function. However, one might want to
allow for a correlation of the wage rate random component with one or
2.3.4. Unobserved wage rates
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As in the ‘marginalist’ approach, also in the RUM approach the problem
of unobserved wage rates for those who are not working can be solved
either with a simultaneous procedure or with a two-step procedure. When
adopting a simultaneous estimation with a DC model, one should also
treat the wage rate w as an endogenous outcome and account for the fact
that w is not observed for the non-workers in the sample. For that pur-
pose we must specify a probability density function m(w). Starting from
expression (13), the likelihood of an observation with non-zero hours h
and wage rate w would then be:
mðwÞ dw    ð25Þ
exp
Ă
vðf ðwk; IÞ; kÞ
In RURO models, the wage rate is endogenous from the very start.
Therefore (in the continuous version), the likelihood of a choice (w,h) is
given by (18) or (23). For example, by inserting (19) into (18) we get
mðw) ð24Þ
ð26Þ
if h = 0
more random parameters of v(f(wh,I),h)  due, for example, to a depen-
dence of the wage rate on previous decisions  (e.g. Blundell & Shephard,
2012; Breunig, Cobb-Clark, & Gong, 2008; Gong & Van Soest, 2002;
Lo¨fﬂer et al., 2013).
Apparently, RUM-type models do not leave much space to the possibility
of involuntary unemployment, since also h= 0 is an optimal choice (non-
participation). If, however, ɛ is interpreted as an optimization error rather
than as part of the utility, then some of the individuals with h= 0 might
be interpreted as involuntary unemployed. Maybe they could be identiﬁed
as those with h= 0 and systematic utility sufﬁciently close (in some sense)
to the systematic utility of those with h> 0. To the best of our knowledge,
this line of research has never been pursued. Instead, some contributions
have taken involuntary unemployment into account by complementing
the basic DC model with an exogenous latent index equation (Blundell
et al., 2000). Euwals and van Soest (1999) have used subjective evaluations
together with observed outcome to model the differences between actual
and desired labour supply. In RURO models, ɛ is strictly interpreted as
part of the utility function and therefore h= 0 is an optimal choice.
However, there is a sense in which these models also account for involun-
tary unemployment: the opportunity density p(w,h) allows for a different
availability of different opportunities to different households, therefore it
can happen that some households have no (or very few) available oppor-
tunities with h> 0.
Both the DC and the RURO model can be easily generalized to include
several dimensions of choice. Besides simultaneous decisions on the part
of partners in a couple, one might include other decisions such as: labour
supply of other members of the household, consumption of goods and ser-
vices, fertility, choice of child-care mode, sector of employment, other
dimensions of labour supply (occupational choice, educational choices, job
search activities, etc.) and so on. For example, Aaberge, Colombino,
Strøm, and Wennemo (2007), Aaberge and Colombino (2006, 2013) and
Dagsvik and Strøm (2006), and Dagsvik, Locatelli, and Strøm (2009)
include the choice between private sector and public sector employment;
Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) model the simultaneous choice of labour
supply and child-care; Haan and Wrohlich (2011) analyse fertility and
employment, Flood, Hansen, and Wahlberg (2004), Hoynes (1996) and
Aaberge and Flood (2013) analyse labour supply and welfare participation.
A potential limitation of the RUM models based on the independent
and identical extreme value distribution for the random component ɛ is
the Independence-of-Irrelevant-Alternatives assumption, which in turn
2.3.5. Involuntary unemployment
2.3.6. Generalizations and developments
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RUM modelling strategy:
(i) Stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) models, for example Miller
and Sanders (1997), Wolpin (1996), Grogger (2003), Swann (2005),
Todd and Wolpin (2006), Keane and Wolpin (2002a, 2002b), Keane
(2011), Keane, Todd, and Wolpin (2011). There are various motiva-
tions for using SDP models. First, many choices  notably human
capital decisions, occupational choices, fertility, etc.  have important
intertemporal implications: namely, the effects of decisions taken
today have important effects in the future (e.g. Miller & Sanders,
1997). Second, many policies have an intrinsic intertemporal dimen-
sion, for example there might be time limits, or it might be that the
amount of services I decide to get today affects the amount of services
I can get tomorrow (Swann, 2005). Third, an important source of
uncertainty in current decisions is the expectation of future changes in
policies, for example expectations on whether a certain policy is tem-
porary or permanent (Keane & Wolpin, 2002a, 2002b).
(ii) Non-unitary models of household behaviour, where the household is
not represented as a ﬁctitious individual but rather as a set of indivi-
duals who  somehow  arrive at a collective decision. A major aim
is developing models that can analyse intra-household allocation of
resources (e.g. among genders) and the effects of policies upon differ-
ent member of the households. As to the way of modelling the process
that leads to the collective decision, there are two main lines of
research: (i) The ‘sharing rule’ approach, for example Chiappori
(1988, 1992), Donni (2003, 2007), Vermeulen (2005), Vermeulen et al.
(2006), Bloemen (2010). Here, the intra-household allocation process
is given a ‘reduced form’ representation: this way of proceeding
requires minimal a priori assumptions (namely, the household attains,
somehow, a Pareto-efﬁcient allocation), but in principle makes the
model not applicable to ex-ante policy evaluation, unless one is pre-
pared to assume that the ‘sharing rule’ is policy-invariant; (ii) The
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implies restrictions on the behavioural responses (e.g. Ben-Akiva &
Lerman, 1985). Some contributions have opted for alternative distribu-
tional assumptions (e.g. Keane & Mofﬁtt, 1998). However, advances with
simulation-based methods (Train, 2009), have made it feasible to overcome
this limitation by assuming GEV distributions (e.g. Nested Logit models)
or random parameters, while preserving the main convenient analytical
advantages of the extreme value distributions. By assuming that one or
more preference parameters are random, one gets the so-called Mixed
Logit model (McFadden & Train, 2000). When it comes to RURO models,
expressions (17) and (18) are also close to a Mixed Logit model since the
wage rate w is random. See also the survey by Keane and Wasi (2013).
Due to space limitations, we can only mention two important develop-
ments in labour supply analysis which also, recently, tend to adopt the
explicit structural representation of intra-household allocation pro-
cess. For example, McElroy and Horney (1981) have proposed Nash
bargaining. Other types of solution are of course possible. So far, this
second approach has been much less popular than the ‘sharing rule’
one, although its structural character makes it more promising in view
of policy simulation (e.g. Bargain & Moreau, 2013; Del Boca & Flinn,
2012; Hernæs, Jia, & Strøm, 2001).
Many authors have raised doubts upon the reliability of structural models
as compared with the (supposed) robustness of evidence produced by
(ex-post) experimental or quasi-experimental analysis (e.g. Bargain &
Doorley, 2013; Blundell, Duncan, & Meghir, 1998; Brewer et al., 2006).
Provided we want ex-ante policy evaluation, the issue is twofold:
(i) Are there alternatives to structural models?
(ii) How do we evaluate structural models and how do they compare with
other approaches?
When answering question (i) one has to carefully distinguish between type
of data and type of models (or parameters) to be estimated. Often we
observe a tendency to associate structural models with observational data
and ex-post programme evaluation with experimental or quasi-
experimental data. Although this is what goes on in most cases, in princi-
ple nothing prevents the use of experimental or quasi-experimental data
for the estimation of structural models. Another possible source of confu-
sion comes from erroneously associating structural modelling with the use
of convenient parametric functional forms: although this might be a com-
mon practice, most of the research done on non-parametric estimation
addressed to policy evaluation is deﬁnitely structural (e.g. Blomquist &
Newey, 2002; Manski, 2012; Matzkin, 2013; Todd & Wolpin, 2008;
Varian, 2012). What counts in view of ex-ante evaluation is that a set of
relevant parameters (or primitives) be identiﬁed as policy independent
(Hurwicz, 1962). Depending on the class of policies we are interested in,
different sets or combinations of parameters might be sufﬁcient for the
purpose (Marschak, 1953). Of course, the point is that in general experi-
mental or quasi-experimental data, by themselves, are not sufﬁcient to
identify policy-invariant parameters. For that purpose they must be ana-
lysed by a model, either in explicit form (e.g. Bargain & Doorley, 2013;
Card & Hyslop, 2005; Todd & Wolpin, 2006), or in an implicit form  as
for example with ‘statistical extrapolation’ (e.g. Chetty, 2009). The avail-
ability of experimental or quasi-experimental evidence promises to
improve the internal validity (or the identiﬁcation conditions) of the
model, but does not overcome the need for a structural approach.
Therefore, the answer to question (i) is negative: ex-ante evaluation
2.4. How reliable are structural models?
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requires a structural model, whether parametric or non-parametric, expli-
cit or implicit, estimated on observational or (quasi-) experimental data,
etc. It is fair to say, however, that more effort would be desirable on
developing models or analysis that somehow go beyond the mainstream
of a parametric model estimated on observational data. Let us turn to
question (ii). The structural econometric community has abandoned the
ideal of the correct speciﬁcation. Models are approximations. Ordinary
statistical testing is informative on the precision of the parameter esti-
mates of the model but less so on how useful the estimated model is. This
pragmatic approach would seem to entail a shift of focus from the issue of
identiﬁcation to the issues of external validation and out-of-sample predic-
tion performance (Keane, 2010; Wolpin, 2007), although this conclusion
is debatable (e.g. Blundell, 2010; Imbens, 2010). The amount of out-of-
sample testing so far is limited (e.g. Aaberge & Colombino, 2006, 2013;
Aaberge et al., 2009; Aaberge & Flood, 2013; Keane & Mofﬁtt, 1998;
Keane & Wolpin, 2002a, 2002b, 2007) but reassuring. A supplementary
evidence provided by out-of-sample prediction exercises suggests that ﬂex-
ible theoretical models  as compared with structural models  tend to
perform better in-sample but worse out-of-sample.
We start by asking, when is information on behavioural responses needed?
Non-behavioural simulations may be sufﬁciently informative provided the
policy changes or the reforms can be represented as marginal changes in
net wages and/or in unearned income. Let u*(w,I) be the indirect utility
function, where w is the net wage rate and I is the unearned income. Let
us suppose that the reform can be represented as a marginal change
(dw,dI). Then we have: du

= ð∂u=∂wÞ dwþ μdI; where μ≡ ð∂u=∂IÞ is the
marginal utility of income. By applying Roy’s Theorem, we get:
ðdu=μÞ= h dwþ dI. The right-hand side is the change in the budget, con-
ditional on the pre-reform labour supply h. The left-hand side is the
monetary equivalent of the change in utility. Therefore, the result tells us
that the change in the budget (i.e. the basic result produced by a non-
behavioural simulation) is a money-metric measure of the change in utility.
Similar arguments can be generalized so that a non-behavioural simulation
can be complemented by point-estimates of elasticities or other local mea-
sures of behavioural responses (e.g. Chetty, 2009).
3. Policy simulation
3.1. Producing simulation outcomes
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When the reforms involve non-marginal changes in the budget con-
straint, we typically want a prediction of the new choices, in particular of
the new value of h or some function of it. Within the ‘reduced form’ and
the ‘marginalist’ approaches (as deﬁned in Section 2) we usually estimate
a labour supply function and (directly or indirectly) a utility function.
With non-linear budget constraints and corner solutions (the case com-
monly faced by analyses adopting the ‘marginalist’ approach), it is in gen-
eral possible to identify the distribution of the random component
capturing unobserved heterogeneity of preferences and/or the distribution
of the measurement/optimization error (whichever is present in the
model). Non-convex budget sets in general require recovering also a direct
or indirect representation of the utility function in order to be able to
simulate the optimal decision. Given the estimates of the (non-random
parameters of) the labour supply function and/or of utility function, those
random components are simulated so that their values are compatible
with the observed values of h. Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) provide a clear
and exhaustive explanation of this procedure. With DP or RURO models,
we can choose between two alternative procedures:
Compute the expected chosen value of the variable of interest, based
upon the estimated choice probabilities, for example Colombino et al.
(2010) and Colombino (2013).
Simulate the value of the systematic utility and of the random compo-
nent corresponding to each alternative in the opportunity set. Identify the
alternative with the highest utility and compute the corresponding value of
the variable of interest. Typically, the random components are kept ﬁxed
across the different policy regimes that one might want to simulate and
compare. As to the current policy regime, simulation might be used as well:
its results will not be identical to the observations but reasonable close at
least in large samples. Alternatively, one might adopt the procedure sug-
gested by Creedy and Kalb (2005b), that is generating a vector of random
components that, given the estimated parameters of the utility function,
are consistent with the observed choices under the current policy regime.
When simulating sample aggregates, such as the total hours worked or
total gross income, the two procedures (a) and (b) should be asymptoti-
cally equivalent, however they might diverge on small samples or sub-
samples. Overall, we can observe that, as far as labour supply models are
concerned, so far we lack a rigorous investigation of the statistical proper-
ties of different methods of producing microsimulation outcomes.8
There appears to be a consensus that the results of non-behavioural pol-
icy microsimulation should be interpreted as ‘the day after’ predictions,
8 The systematic analysis of the statistical properties of alternative methods for producing
predictions is more advanced in other areas where RUM models are used, for example
Watanatada and Ben-Akiva (1979) and Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985).
3.1.1. Interpretation of the policy simulation results: short-run, long-run,
comparative statics
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that is predictions of the very short term, when agents and market inter-
actions did not have time yet to adjust to the new policy. As argued
above, even in the long-run, non-behavioural results might be considered
a sufﬁcient statistic provided the reforms can be represented as marginal
changes in the budget constraint. The interpretation of behavioural
microsimulation results raises more complicated and controversial issues.
The typical policy simulation exercise computes the labour supply effects
while leaving the wage rates unchanged. Some authors (e.g. Creedy &
Duncan, 2005) interpret this scenario as the ‘month after’ prediction,
with households making new choices but the market mechanisms still
late in the process of adjusting wage rates, labour demand etc. An alter-
native interpretation might view the typical simulation exercise as a ‘very
long-run’ prediction, with a perfectly elastic labour demand deﬁned by
the current wage rates. In any case, comparative statics is the appropri-
ate perspective with behavioural microsimulation models based on a
static representation of agents’ choices, that is we want to compare two
different equilibria induced by two different policies. With the notion of
equilibrium, we refer in general to a scenario in which the economic
agents make optimal choices (i.e. they choose the best alternative among
those available in the opportunity set) and their choices are mutually
consistent or feasible. The comparative statics perspective is relevant
both when the new equilibrium is reached in a short time and is maybe
temporary (as might be the case with an intervention explicitly designed
to have an immediate effect) and when instead we evaluate reforms of
institutions or policies with long-run (and possibly long-standing) effects.
In order to produce simulation results that respect the comparative sta-
tics perspective, Creedy and Duncan (2005) and Peichl and Siegloch
(2012) have proposed procedures where DC labour supply models
(as deﬁned in Section 2) are complemented by a function of labour
demand and the wage rates are adjusted so that an appropriate or feasi-
ble equilibrium criterion is satisﬁed. These procedures, however, in gen-
eral would not be consistent with RURO models, which already include
a representation of the density of market jobs of different types at the
time of observation. In general, the notion of equilibrium will imply
some relationship between the opportunity density and the size and com-
position of labour supply: since a reform will induce a change in labour
supply, it follows that in equilibrium also the opportunity density will
have to change. This observation carries over to DC models with dum-
mies reﬁnement, to the extent that the alternative-speciﬁc constants
reﬂect also the demand side (e.g. the availability of jobs): a new equili-
brium induced by a reform should entail a change of the alternative-
speciﬁc constants. Colombino (2013) proposes and exempliﬁes an iterative
simulation procedure that exploits the structural interpretation of the coef-
ﬁcients of the alternative-speciﬁc constants given in expression (22) of
Section 2.
Type of policy analysis Country Contributions
Flat tax Australia Creedy, Kalb, and Kew (2003), Creedy and
Kalb (2005a), Scutella (2004)
Germany Beninger et al. (2006), Fuest el al. (2008)
Italy Aaberge, Colombino, and Strøm (2000),
Aaberge, Colombino, Strøm, and Wennemo,
2000), Aaberge et al. (2004)
Norway Aaberge et al. (1995), Aaberge, Colombino,
Strøm, and Wennemo (2000)
Spain Labeaga et al. (2008)
Sweden Blomquist (1983), Blomquist and Hansson-
Brusewitz (1990), Aaberge, Colombino,
Strøm, and Wennemo (2000)
Unconditional transfers and
Basic Income
Australia Scutella (2004)
Canada Clavet, Duclos, and Lacroix (2013)
Germany Horstschra¨er, Clauss, and Schnabel (2010)
Italy Colombino (2013, 2014), Colombino et al.
(2010), and Colombino and Narazani
(2013, 2014)
Mean-tested transfers,
Negative Income Tax and
Work Fare
France Bargain and Doorley (2013), Gurgand and
Margolis (2008)
Canada Fortin, Truchon, and Beausejour (1993)
Italy Aaberge, Colombino, Strøm, (2000), Aaberge
et al. (2004), Colombino et al. (2010), and
Colombino and Narazani (2013, 2014)
US Burtless and Hausman (1978)
In-work beneﬁts, Tax credits
and Wage subsidies
Australia Creedy (2005)
Belgium Decoster and Vanleenhove (2012)
Canada Clavet et al. (2013)
France Bargain and Orsini (2006)
Germany Haan and Myck (2007), Bargain and Orsini
(2006)
Italy Colombino (2014), Colombino and Narazani
(2013, 2014), Colonna and Marcassa (2012),
De Luca, Rossetti, and Vuri (2012), Figari
(2011), Haan and Steiner (2008), Paciﬁco
(2013)
Sweden Flood, Wahlberg, and Pylkka¨nen (2007)
Sweden Aaberge and Flood (2013)
3.2. Examples of simulations addressing speciﬁc policies or issues
Table 1. Tax and beneﬁt analyses based on structural microeconometric
models
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As explained in Section 1, the microeconometric models of labour
supply can be, and have been, used to evaluate by simulation a very large
variety of policies and reforms. Most applications concern tax-beneﬁt
and welfare policies. While it would be clearly impossible to present an
exhaustive list, in Table 1 we summarize a selection of notable examples.
tax-transfer reforms, but also in the identiﬁcation of optimal tax-transfer
systems. To see this, it is useful to review brieﬂy the basic framework
adopted by theoretical optimal taxation (Mirrlees, 1971). Agents  house-
holds  differ by their market productivity=wage rate w. They solve
Type of policy analysis Country Contributions
UK Duncan and Giles (1996), Bingley and Walker
(1997), Blundell (2006), Blundell and Hoynes
(2004), Blundell et al. (2000), Blundell,
Brewer, Haan, and Shephard (2009), Blundell
and Shepard (2012), Brewer (2001, 2009),
Brewer et al. (2006), Brewer, Francesconi,
Gregg, and Grogger (2009)
US Aaberge and Flood (2013), Keane (1995), Kean
and Mofﬁtt (1998), Meyer and Rosenbaum
(2001), Meyer and Holtz-Eakin (2002), Blank
(2002), Meyer and Holtz-Eakin (2002), Hotz
and Scholz (2003), Fang and Keane (2004),
Eissa and Hoynes (2004, 2006, 2011), Grogger
(2003), Grogger and Karoly (2005), Mofﬁtt
(2006), and Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner (2008)
Welfare participation and
labour supply
Sweden Flood et al. (2004), Aaberge and Flood (2013)
US Mofﬁtt (1983), Fraker and Mofﬁtt (1988),
Hoynes (1996), Keane and Mofﬁtt (1998)
Child care and labour supply Australia Kalb (2009)
Belgium Van Klaveren and Ghysels (2012)
Germany Wrohlich (2008), Haan and Wrohlich (2011)
Italy Del Boca (2002), Del Boca and Vuri (2007)
Norway Kornstad and Thoresen (2006, 2007)
Russia Lokshin (2004)
Sweden Gustafsson and Stafford (1992)
US Heckman (1974a, 1974b), Rosen (1976), Blau
and Robbins (1988), Ribar (1995)
Fertility and labour supply Italy Del Boca (2002)
Germany Haan and Wrohlich (2011)
US Hotz and Miller (1988)
Optimal taxation Australia Creedy and He´rault (2012)
Germany Blundell et al. (2009), Bach, Corneo, and
Steiner (2012)
Italy Aaberge and Colombino (2012)
Norway Aaberge and Colombino (2006, 2013),
Sweden Ericson and Flood (2012)
UK Blundell et al. (2009), Blundell and Shepard
(2012)
3.3. Identifying optimal systems
3.3.1. Empirical applications of theoretical optimal taxation model
Labour supply is central not only in the design and evaluation of speciﬁc
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Table 1. (Continued )
max
c;h
uðc; hÞ
s:t:
c=wh− TðwhÞ
where
u(c,h)= u(c)−h= utility function, assumed  for simplicity of illustra-
tion  to be separable in c and h and with no income effects;
c= net available income;
h= hours of work;
T(z)=tax to be paid by an agent with earnings z=wh.
The Social Planner solves
max
c;h
R∞
0
W uwð Þf ðwÞ dw
s:t:R∞
0
TðzwÞf ðwÞ dw=R
uw = max
c;h
uðc; hÞ c:v: c=wh−TðwhÞ
where
W(·)=Social Welfare function
R= total tax revenue to be collected (exogenously given)
zw≡whw
hw= arg maxh u(c,h) c.v. c=wh−T(wh)
f(w)=Fw(w)=probability density function of w.
zðzwÞ
1− TzðzwÞ
= 1þ 1
ξðwÞ
 	
×
1−FðwÞð Þ
wf ðwÞ
 	
×
R∞
w
1−Ωmð Þf ðmÞdm
1−FðwÞ
 	
where Tz(z
w)=marginal tax rate for a household with productivity w (and
therefore earnings zw);
ξ(w)=labour supply elasticity of a household with productivity w;
Ωm=marginal social weight given to the consumption of a household
many authors (e.g. Tuomala, 1990) to perform illustrative simulation
exercises where optimal taxes are computed given imputed or calibrated
measures of ξ(w) and F(w). A typical criticism moved to these exercises is
that they do not account properly for the heterogeneity of the preferences
and productivity across the population (e.g. Tuomala, 2010). Revesz
(1989), Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001, 2002), among others, present
reformulations of Mirrlees’s model that are more directly interpretable in
terms of empirically observable variables and make it more convenient to
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The solution to problem (28) can be expressed as follows:T
with productivity w.
Expressions like (29) or more general versions of it have been used by
   ð29Þ
account for agents’ heterogeneity. These reformulations have been used in
conjunction with microeconometric models. In particular, Saez (2002)
develops a discrete model that assigns a crucial role to the relative magni-
tude of the labour supply elasticities at the extensive and at the intensive
margin. There are J+ 1 types of job, each paying (in increasing order) z0,
z1, ..., zJ. Job ‘0’ denotes non-working conditions (non-participation or
unemployment). Net available income on job j is cj= zj−Tj where Tj is the
tax paid at income level zj. Each agent is characterized by one of the
potential incomes z0, z1, ..., zJ and if she decides to work she is allocated
to the corresponding job. The agent of type j decides to work if cj≥ c0.
The extensive margin (or participation) elasticity is deﬁned as
ηj =
cj − c0
πj
∂πj
∂ cj − c0ð Þ, where πj is the proportion of agents on job of type j.
Working agents can also move to a different job if income opportunities
change, but the movements (for reasons implicit in the assumptions of the
model) are limited to adjacent jobs (i.e. from job j to job j− 1 or job j+ 1).
The intensive margin elasticity is deﬁned as:
ξj =
cj − cj− 1
πj
∂πj
∂ cj − cj− 1ð Þ. Then it turns out that the optimal taxes satisfy:
Tj −Tj− 1
cj − cj− 1
=
1
ξj
PJ
k= j
πk 1−Ωk − ηk
Tk − T0
ck − c0
h i
πj
where Ωk is the marginal social value of income at job k. The model is
attractive in view of empirical applications because it seems to ﬁt well to
the DC framework. Recent applications include: Blundell et al. (2009)
(optimal taxation of single mothers in Germany and the United
Kingdom); Haan and Wrohlich (2010) (optimal design of children beneﬁts
in Germany); Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2007) (evaluation of
income maintenance policies in European countries).
The studies coupling theoretical optimal taxation results with microsi-
mulation proceed as follows. The researcher looks for an analytical solu-
tion to the optimal taxation problem, that is a ‘formula’ that allows to
compute the optimal taxes or marginal tax rates as function of exogenous
variables and parameters. Next, the numerical simulations consist in cal-
culating the analytical solution with exogenous variables and parameters
assigned numerical values produced by microeconometric estimates.
There are two main problems with this procedure. First, in order to get an
analytical solution we must adopt many simplifying and restrictive
assumptions. Second, when we ‘feed’ the formulas with empirical mea-
sures, we are very likely to face an inconsistency between the theoretical
results and the empirical evidence, since the latter was typically generated
under assumptions that are very different for those that made it possible
obtaining the former. For example, Saez (2002) assumes there are no
income effects and speciﬁes a very special and limited representation of
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choices at the intensive margin. None of these assumptions are shared by
the typical microeconometric models used to simulate the elasticities.
A number of studies have used labour supply microsimulation models to
explore the policy space deﬁned by certain types of tax-transfer systems.
Fortin et al. (1993) calibrate (on the basis of previous estimates or ‘rea-
sonable’ imputation) a collective ‘marginalist’ model of household labour
supply and run it in order to identify the best income support mechan-
ism within a set including many versions of the Negative Income Tax
and of a Workfare system. The contributions mentioned hereafter adopt
a RURO approach. Aaberge et al. (2004) evaluate rules such as the Flat
Tax, the Negative Income Tax and the Workfare as hypothetical reforms
in Italy. Colombino et al. (2010), Colombino and Narazani (2013) and
Colombino (2013) focus on Basic Income policies. Ericson and Flood
(2012) look for welfare improving changes in the Swedish tax-beneﬁt
system.
The method (as presented in Aaberge & Colombino, 2013) is formu-
lated as follows:
3.3.2. Identiﬁcation of an optimal rule by searching the policy space
3.3.3. Optimal taxation by simulation
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In order to overcome the drawbacks of the simulation exercises coupled
with theoretical optimal taxation (see Section 3.3.1), recent contribu-
tions have proposed a computational approach (Aaberge & Colombino,
2006, 2012, 2013; Blundell & Shephard, 2012). Modern microeconometric
models of labour supply are based on very general and ﬂexible assump-
tions. They can accommodate many realistic features such as general
structures of heterogeneous preferences, simultaneous decisions of house-
hold members, non-unitary mechanisms of household decisions, compli-
cated (non-convex, non-continuous, non-differentiable, etc.) constraints
and opportunity sets, multidimensional heterogeneity of both households
and jobs, quantitative constraints, etc. It is simply not feasible (at least so
far) to obtain analytical solutions for the optimal taxation problem in
such environments. Yet those features are very relevant and important
especially in view of evaluating or designing reforms (Colombino, 2009).
An alternative (or maybe complementary) procedure consists of using a
microeconometric model to obtain a computational solution of the opti-
mal taxation problem. The microeconometric model, which primarily
simulates the agents’ choices by utility maximization, is embedded into a
global maximization algorithm that solves the social planner’s problem,
that is the maximization of a social welfare function subject to the public
budget constraint.
max
ϑ
W U1 c1; h1; j1ð Þ;U2 c2; h2; j2ð Þ; :::;UN cN ; hN ; jNð Þð Þ
s:t:
cn; hn; jnð Þ= arg max
w;h;jð Þ∈Bn
Un c; h; jð Þ s:t: c= f ðwh; In; ϑÞ; ∀n
XN
n= 1
wnhnþ In − f ðwnhn; In; ϑÞð Þ≥R
Agent n can choose a ‘job’ within an opportunity set Bn. Each job is
deﬁned by a wage rate w, hours of work h and other characteristics j
(unobserved by the analyst). Given gross earnings wh and gross unearned
income I, net available income is determined by a tax-transfer function
c= f(wh,I;ϑ) deﬁned up to a vector of parameters ϑ. For any given
tax-transfer rule (i.e. any given value of ϑ) the choices by the agents are
simulated by a microeconometric model that allows for a very ﬂexible
representation of heterogeneous preferences and opportunity sets, it cov-
ers both singles and couples, accounts for quantity constraints and is able
to treat any tax-transfer rule however complex. Note that it would be
hopeless to look for analytical solutions of an optimal taxation problem
in such an environment. The choices made by the N agents result in N
positions (c1,h1,j1), (c2,h2,j2), …, (cN,hN,jN), which are then evaluated by
the social planner according to a Social Welfare function W. The Social
Planner’s problem therefore consists of searching for the value of the
parameters ϑ that maximizes W subject to the following constraints:
(i) the various positions (c1,h1,j1), …, (cN,hN,jN) result from utility-
maximizing choices on the part of the agents (incentive-compatibility
constraints); (ii) the total net tax revenue must attain a given amount R
(public budget constraint).
The optimal taxation problem is solved computationally by iteratively
simulating the household choices for different values of ϑ until W is
maximized.
Any exercise involving a comparison between the utility levels attained
by heterogeneous households requires developing comparable measures of
utility or individual welfare. If, moreover, we adopt social welfare as the
criterion for comparing alternative policies we must specify a Social
Welfare function. The next section is devoted to these two issues.
4. Social evaluation of policy simulations
4.1. Individual welfare functions
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As explained in Sections 2 and 3, empirical microeconomic models of
labour supply are helpful tools for simulating the effects on households’
labour supply and income from changes in tax and beneﬁt systems or
from changes in distributions of wage rates and hours of work offered by
the demand side of the labour market. However, to complete the eco-
nomic evaluation of policy reforms a framework for analysing the out-
comes from the simulation exercises is required. It is straightforward to
provide a summary of changes in employments rates and distributions of
hours of work and income. However, a social planner needs information
that makes it possible to compare individuals’ level of welfare before and
after a policy change and thus who is gaining and who is losing on the
policy change. It is, however, not obvious how one should make a social
evaluation of the policy effects when each individual’s welfare is consid-
ered to be a function of income and leisure. The estimated utility func-
tions (or their systematic parts) might emerge as a useful basis for making
social evaluations of welfare. However, since the behaviour of an indivi-
dual is invariant with respect to monotonic transformations of the utility
function we face two problems. The ﬁrst one concerns the construction of
speciﬁc cardinal utility functions to represent the consumption/leisure
preferences of individuals/households, and the second concerns the lack
of convincing justiﬁcation for comparing arbitrarily chosen individual
cardinal utility functions and use them as arguments in a social welfare
function (see e.g. the thorough discussion provided by Hammond, 1991).
The origin of the problem is as stated by Hume that one cannot derive an
‘ought’ from an ‘is’. To circumvent these problems Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980), King (1983) and Hammond (1991) proposed to use a
common utility function as a tool for making interpersonal comparisons
of welfare, since it by deﬁnition contains within it interpersonal compar-
ability of both welfare levels and welfare differences. The common utility
function is supposed to capture the preferences of the social planner,
whereas the individual/household-speciﬁc utility functions solely are
assumed to capture the consumption/leisure preferences of individuals/
households. The latter can be used to simulate the behaviour of indivi-
duals/households under alternative tax/beneﬁt systems, whereas the for-
mer is designed to be used for evaluating the outcomes of simulation
exercises. However, even though there was agreement about the require-
ment of a common utility function the problem of how to construct it
would remain. As argued by Aaberge and Colombino (2013) a plausible
approach is to assume that the social planner exploits the information
provided by the consumption/leisure choices of the individuals/households
(and moreover accounts for large heterogeneity in the availability of dif-
ferent jobs in the market) by estimating the common utility function.
Alternatively, a speciﬁc utility function (e.g. the utility function of the
poorest, the richest or the median) can be used as the common utility
function. Examples of the latter approach can be found in King (1983) for
housing choices and in Aaberge et al. (2004) for labour supply choices.
As opposed to the common utility approach the practice of basing
social evaluations on distributions of individual-speciﬁc money-metric
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measures of utility differences like equivalent and compensation variation
disregards the interpersonal comparability problem, which makes it difﬁ-
cult to judge the ethical signiﬁcance of this approach.9 An alternative and
more promising approach aiming at respecting individual (consumption/
leisure) preferences in welfare analyses has been proposed by Fleurbaey
(2003, 2008) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) and applied by Bargain,
Decoster, et al. (2013) and Decoster and Haan (2014) in analyses of
labour supply. However, as acknowledged by Decoster and Haan (2014),
the choice of a speciﬁc preference respecting welfare metric might have a
signiﬁcant impact on the result of the welfare evaluation, and moreover it
is shown to depend on the degree of emphasis the welfare metric places on
willingness-to-work. Thus, depending on the chosen metric a work averse
or work loving individual will be more or less favoured, which means that
the social planner faces the problem of giving more or less weight to peo-
ple with preferences that exhibit low or high willingness-to-work.
Below we will provide an explanation of the speciﬁc version of the
common utility approach employed by Aaberge and Colombino (2013)
for designing optimal taxes based on a microeconomic model of labour
supply. Since households differ with regard to size and composition it is
required to construct a common utility function that justiﬁes comparison
of individual welfare for individuals. The common utility function (indivi-
dual welfare function) V is to be interpreted just as the input of a social
welfare function and thus differs from the role played by the actual utility
function U for households. The individual welfare function (V) is assumed
to have a functional form that is identical to the basic functional form of
the systematic part of the positive utility function U, which means that
the heterogeneity of the parameters of U has been removed. Thus, V is
deﬁned by
Vðy; hÞ= γ2
yγ1 − 1
γ1
 
þ γ4
Lγ3 − 1
γ3
 
where L is leisure, deﬁned as L= 1− (h/8736), and y is the individual’s
income after tax deﬁned by
y=
c= f wh; Ið Þ for singles
cﬃﬃﬃ
2
p = 1ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p f wFhF ;wMhM ; Ið Þ for married=cohab: individuals:
8<
:
Thus, couples incomes are transformed into comparable individual-
speciﬁc incomes by dividing the couple incomes by the square root of 2.
The next problem is to assess the value of the four parameters of the
9 See, for example Aaberge et al. (1995, 2000) and Creedy and He´rault (2012).
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   ð32Þ
   ð33Þ
A different way to circumvent the interpersonal comparability problem
consists in avoiding interpersonal comparisons altogether and basing the
social evaluation exclusively on intrapersonal comparisons of utility levels,
which of course is less informative. A proper application of the ordinal
criterion would require deﬁning the optimal tax in a different way, for
example the rule that maximizes the number of winners. However, since
the winners might be the individuals with the highest pre-reform welfare
levels the ordinal criterion does obviously not account for distributional
effects and may, for that reason, be considered as an inappropriate social
evaluation approach.
this end, let social preferences be represented by the ordering≽ deﬁned on
the family F of distributions of individual welfare. The preference order-
ing is assumed to be continuous, transitive and complete and to satisfy
Variable Parameter Estimate Std. dev.
Income after tax (y)
γ1 −0.649 0.086
γ2 3.026 0.138
Leisure (L)
γ3 −12.262 0.556
γ4 0.045 0.011
4.2. Social welfare functions  the primal and dual approach
Table 2. Estimates of the parameters of the welfare function for
individuals 20 to 62 years old, Norway 1994
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common utility function for individuals on the basis of the observed lei-
sure and income data where individual incomes are deﬁned by Eq. (33).
Since the observed chosen combinations of leisure and income depend on
the availability of various job opportunities, we use expression (26),
where the systematic part of the utility function v is replaced by the indivi-
dual welfare function (V) deﬁned by Eq. (32), as a basis for estimating
the parameters of V. Table 2 displays the parameter estimates.
The informational structure of the individual welfare functions (deﬁned
by the common utility function (32) or Fleurbaey’s preference respecting
welfare metrics) allows comparison of welfare levels as well as gains and
losses of different individuals due to a policy change. Comparison of
distributions of individual welfare, formed for example by alternative
hypothetical tax reforms, might be made in terms of dominance criteria of
ﬁrst- and second degree. However, since distribution functions normally
intersect even second-degree dominance may not provide an unambiguous
ranking of the distributions in question. Dominance criteria of higher
degree can as demonstrated by Aaberge et al. (2013) provide a complete
ranking, but it would in any case be helpful to quantify social welfare. To
ﬁrst-degree stochastic dominance as well as the following independence
axiom,
Axiom (Independence). Let F1, F2 and F3 be members of F(V) and let
α∈ [0,1]. Then F1≽F2 implies αF1+ (1− α)F3≽ αF2+ (1− α)F3.
This axiom focuses attention on the proportion of people F(y) for a
given level V of individual welfare and imposes an invariance condition
on the proportions F1(V) and F2(V) being compared. Instead, we might
focus on the income level F−1(t) that is associated with a given proportion
of people t, that is, the rank in the distribution F, and impose an invar-
iance condition on the individual welfare levels F − 11 ðtÞ and F − 12 ðtÞ being
compared. This corresponds to an alternative version of the independence
axiom, which is called the dual independence axiom in the literatures on
uncertainty and inequality,
Axiom (Dual Independence). Let F1, F2 and F3 be members of F
and let α∈[0,1]. Then F1≽F2 implies αF − 11 þ 1− αð ÞF − 13
 − 1
αF − 12 þ

1− αð ÞF − 13 Þ− 1.
The axioms require that the ordering is invariant with respect to certain
changes in the distributions being compared. It is these axioms that give
social preferences an empirical content. If F1 is weakly preferred to F2,
then the Independence Axiom (similar to the expected utility theory) states
that any mixture on F1 is weakly preferred to the corresponding mixture
on F2. The intuition is that identical mixing interventions on the distribu-
tions do not affect their ranking; the ranking depends solely on how the
differences between the mixed distributions are judged. Thus, the axiom
requires the ordering relation≽to be invariant with respect to aggregation
of sub-populations across individual welfare. The Dual Independence
axiom postulates a similar invariance property on the inverse distributions.
It says that, if we consider a decomposition by sources of individual wel-
fare, then dominance with regard to one set of sources implies, other
things equal, overall dominance. The essential difference between the two
axioms is that the Independence Axiom deals with the relationship
between a given level of individual welfare and weighted averages of corre-
sponding population proportions, while the Dual Independence Axiom
deals with the relationship between given population proportions and
weighted averages of corresponding levels of individual welfare.
The choice between the two independence axioms determines whether
the associated family of welfare functions can be considered as a primal
or dual family of social welfare functions.10 The ‘primal approach’ is
10 See Aaberge (2001) and Aaberge and Atkinson (2013) for similar discussions of how to
summarize the information content of Lorenz curves and headcount curves.
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analogue to the inequality framework developed by Atkinson (1970),
while the ‘dual approach’ is analogue to the rank-dependent measurement
of social welfare introduced by Weymark (1981) and Yaari (1988). As is
well known the Independence Axiom justiﬁes the following family of
social welfare functions,
ξðFÞ=
Z ∞
0
x1− θ dFðxÞ
  1
1− θ
dependent welfare functions,11
11 Several other authors have discussed rationales for rank-dependent measures of inequality
and social welfare, see for example Sen (1974), Hey and Lambert (1980), Donaldson and
Weymark (1980, 1983), Weymark (1981), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994), Aaberge (2007)
and Aaberge et al. (2013).
39 Rolf Aaberge and Ugo Colombino
   ð37Þ
where θ ≥ 0 deﬁnes the degree of inequality aversion of the social welfare
function. The simplest welfare function is the one that adds up the indivi-
dual welfare levels, which is obtained by inserting u(x)=x in Eq. (34) orθ
= 0 in Eq. (37). The objection to the linear additive welfare function is
that the individuals are given equal welfare weights, independent of
whether they are poor or rich. Concern for distributive justice requires,
however, that poor individuals are assigned larger welfare weights than
rich individuals. This is consistent with inserting a strictly concave u-func-
tion in Eq. (34). A similar structure is captured by the family of rank-
μ
where F is a distribution with mean μ of the individual welfare V, and u is
a non-decreasing concave evaluation function of individual welfare
levels that reﬂects the preferences of a social planner who support the
Independence Axiom. As demonstrated by Atkinson (1970) W can be
represented by the equally distributed equivalent welfare level deﬁned by:
   ð36Þ
uðxÞ dFðx)                                                                                     (34Þ
ðW ðFÞÞ ð35Þ
Thus, ξ(F) is the equally distributed individual welfare level that would
yield the same level of social welfare as the actual distribution F. Since
W ðFÞ =
Z
0
∞
ξðFÞ = u − 1
ξ(F)≤μ Atkinson (1970) used ξ(F) as a basis for deﬁning the following
family of inequality measures,
IðFÞ = 1 − ξðFÞ
The following speciﬁc family of social welfare functions and associated
inequality measures were introduced by Atkinson (1970),
− log t; i= 1
i
i− 1
1− ti− 1
 
; i= 2; 3; :::
8<
:
Note that the inequality aversion exhibited by the social welfare function
W

i (associated with pi(t)) decreases with increasing i. As i→∞, W

i
approaches inequality neutrality and coincides with the linear additive
welfare function deﬁned by
W∞ =
Z 1
0
F − 1
It follows by straightforward calculations that Wi≤μ for all i and that Wi is
equal to the mean μ for ﬁnite i if and only if F is the egalitarian distribution.
Thus,Wi can be interpreted as the equally distributed individual welfare level.
As recognized by Yaari (1988) this property suggests that Ci, deﬁned by
Ci = 1−
Wi
can be used as a summary measure of inequality and moreover can be
proved to be a member of the ‘illfare-ranked single-series Ginis’ class
introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980).13 Thus, as was recognized
approaches for measuring social welfare where the ﬁrst stage consists of using the com-
mon utility function to aggregate the two goods (consumption and leisure) for each indivi-
dual into a measure of well-being and the second stage to aggregate the well-being across
individuals into a measure of social welfare. As demonstrated by Bosmans, Decancq, and
Ooghe (2013) the two-stage approach can be given an axiomatic normative justiﬁcation.
13 Aaberge (2007) provides an axiomatic justiﬁcation for using the Ck  measures as criteria
for ranking Lorenz curves.
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(38) can be given a similar normative justiﬁcation as for the family
(34). Given suitable continuity and dominance assumptions for the pre-
  ð39Þ
ðtÞ dt    ð38Þ
ðtÞ dt= μ    ð40Þ
μ
12 Note that Eqs. (32)(34) and (32), (33) and (40) can be considered as two-stage
; i= 1; 2; :::    ð41Þ
W ðFÞ =
Z
0
1
pðtÞF − 1
where F−1 is the left inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the
individual welfare levels V with mean μ, and p(t) is a positive concave
weight-function deﬁned on the unit interval.12 The social welfare functions
ference ordering ≽ deﬁned on the family of income distributions F, Yaari
(1987, 1988) demonstrated that the Dual Independence Axiom charac-
terizes the family of rank-dependent measures of social welfare functions
(38) where represents the preferences of the social planner. Aaberge
(2007) proposed to use the following speciﬁcation of p(t),
piðtÞ =
by Ebert (1987) the justiﬁcation of the social welfare function
Wi= μ(1−Ci) can also be made in terms of a value judgement of the
trade-off between the mean and (in)equality in the distribution of welfare.
To ease the interpretation of the inequality aversion proﬁles exhibited
to changes in policies that affect the welfare of the poor, whereas the
inequality aversion proﬁle of W3 is rather moderate and W∞ exhibits neu-
trality with respect to inequality.
A number of recent contributions identify optimal tax-beneﬁt rules by
employing a microeconometric labour supply model together with microsi-
mulation and (some version of) the social evaluation framework presented
above. Aaberge and Colombino (2006, 2013) identify the optimal income
tax in Norway within the class of piecewise linear systems. Aaberge and
Colombino (2012) perform a similar exercise for Italy, where however the
Social Welfare criterion adopted is based on a version of the Roemer’s
(1998) Equality-of-Opportunity criterion. Blundell and Shephard (2012)
look for an optimal tax-beneﬁt rule for low-income families with children
in the United Kingdom. Bach et al. (2012) consider optimal taxation with
household income splitting. Creedy and He´rault (2012) explore welfare
improving directions for tax-beneﬁt reforms in Australia.
W1 (Bonferroni) W2 (Gini) W3 W∞ (Utilitarian)
p(0.01)/p(0.5) 6.64 1.98 1.33 1
p(0.05)/p(0.5) 4.32 1.90 1.33 1
p(0.30)/p(0.5) 1.74 1.40 1.21 1
p(0.95)/p(0.5) 0.07 0.10 0.13 1
5. Socially optimal income taxes
Table 3. Distributional weight proﬁles of four different social welfare
functions
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by W1, W2, W3 and W∞. Table 3 provides ratios of the corresponding
weights  as deﬁned by (39)  of the median individual and respectively
the 5 per cent poorest, the 30 per cent poorest and the 5 per cent richest
individual for different social welfare criteria. As can be observed from
the weight proﬁles provided by Table 3 W1 will be particularly sensitive
Instead of relying on a priori theoretical results as in previous empirical
applications of optimal taxation theory, the microeconometric-simulation
approach allows for a much more ﬂexible representation of households’
heterogeneous characteristics and behaviour and permits the analysis of
more complicated tax-beneﬁt rules. This has signiﬁcant implications upon
the results. For example, Aaberge and Colombino (2013), for each of the
social welfare functions referred to in Table 3, identify the tax system
that maximizes social welfare within a class of 10 parameter tax rules. The
results show that the marginal tax rates of each of the optimal tax systems
turned out to be monotonically increasing with income and that more
egalitarian social welfare functions tended to imply more progressive tax
rules. Moreover, the optimal bottom marginal tax rate is negative,
suggesting a mechanism close to policies like the Working Families Tax
Credit in the United Kingdom, the Earned Income Tax Credit in the
United States and the In-Work Tax Credit in Sweden. The overall picture
emerging is in sharp contrast with most of the results obtained by the
numerical exercises based on Mirrlees’s optimal tax type of formulas. The
typical outcome of those exercises envisages a positive lump-sum transfer
which is progressively taxed away by very high marginal tax rates on
lower incomes (i.e. a negative income tax mechanism), in combination
(close to) ﬂat (or even decreasing) marginal tax rates for higher incomes.
The results obtained with the microsimulation approach seems to support
what suggested by Tuomala (2010): the theory-based results might be
enforced by the restrictive assumptions made on the preferences, the elas-
ticities and the distribution of productivities (or wage rates), which in turn
might be in conﬂict with the empirical evidence provided by microeco-
nomic labour supply studies.
The original concept of microsimulation envisaged large models of the
entire economic (or even socio-economic) system  as an alternative to
the then dominating large macroeconometric models  including beha-
vioural responses. The events took a different route. On the one hand, the
ﬁrst successful implementations of microsimulation models at the policy
level were non-behavioural. On the other hand, the researchers working
on microeconometric models of labour supply started using microsimula-
tion tools for policy design and evaluation. In this chapter, we have docu-
mented the evolution of different labour supply modelling strategies,
together with their notable policy applications that use microsimulation
methods. Further developments, both on the microsimulation algorithms
side and on the microeconometric side, might or might not favour a re-
encounter between large microsimulation algorithms and behavioural
labour supply analysis. While further developments on the side of microsi-
mulation technology is documented in other chapters, on the side of micro-
econometric labour supply models, four research directions are likely to
attract more and more attention: (i) intertemporal decisions and decisions
under uncertainty; (ii) other dimensions of labour supply (educational and
occupational choices, effort, etc.); (iii) modelling intra-household alloca-
tion, in particular the structural approach; (iv) development of standar-
dized procedures for improving external (i.e. out-of-sample) validation and
internal validation (e.g. non-parametric identiﬁcation and estimation with
6. Conclusions and future perspectives
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experimental or quasi-experimental data) of structural models. The general
problem is that there is a trade-off between the increasing theoretical
sophistication of labour supply models (e.g. stochastic dynamic program-
ming models, intra-household allocation or collective model, etc.) and their
ﬂexibility in interacting with other models representing different segments
the economic system. There seem to be three  not mutually exclusive 
main directions, in various degree dependent on the quality of the available
data and on how sophisticated and ﬂexible both the microeconometric
methodology and the microsimulation algorithms will become. First, very
speciﬁc (both methodologically and policy-wise) labour supply ‘modules’
can be more or less ‘mechanically’ linked to system-wide models, the latter
being in turn micro- or macro-analytic or a combination of the two. This is
close to the current most common practice on micro-macro models.
Second, it might be the case that empirical research on labour supply 
whether based on observational, experimental, or quasi-experimental
data  at a certain point reaches a degree of robustness and generality
comparable to an accounting relationship, and can therefore be perma-
nently incorporated into a system-wide microsimulation model. Third, it
might be that microeconometric results on labour supply attain a level that
allows both speciﬁcity and ﬂexibility and permits a structural (micro-
founded rather than mechanical) linkage with other micro-analytic beha-
vioural modules and system-wide algorithms.
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